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BOOK REVIEW
"SPEECH ACTS" AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT. By Franklyn S.
Haiman. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Uni-
versity Press 1993. pp. 103. $17.50.
Reviewed by Lawrence Friedman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Of the 1989 student protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square,
one image lingers still: a lone figure standing motionless before
a column of tanks, an extreme act of self-expression in defense
of the right to express oneself.' The makeshift Statue of Liber-
ty erected by the students occupying the Square pointed to the
country providing their inspiration. The foundations of that
inspiration may in turn be traced to the handful of
words---"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech, or the press . . . "--which have become synonymous
with American-style democracy.'
* Senior law clerk, New Hampshire Superior Court. BA., 1989, Connecticut Col-
lege; J.D., 1993, Boston College Law School. I am grateful to my colleagues, Jennifer
Foley and Kelly Wenstrup, for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of
this review.
1. University students occupied Tiananmen Square in April 1989, demonstrating
against the treatment of former Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang, as well as the
economic and social conditions in the People's Republic of China. See Jeffrey A.
McCredie, Human Rights Concerns in the People's Republic of China: An Appraisal of
Recent Events, 3 TEMP. INT'L & CohiP. L.J. 217, 217-18 (1989); Jeane Kirkpatrick, The
Beijing Spring, WASH. POST, June 13, 1989, at A27.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. As William Van Alstyne observed:
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In reality, the First Amendment's free speech protections
exist in two forms. The first is that idealized by the Chinese
students in Tiananmen Square, a boundless, autonomous
freedom of expression. The second is that of experience, for
Erwin Griswold was surely correct when he argued that "no
law' does not mean 'no law."4 The Supreme Court has stated
time and again that certain actions may be proscribed so long
as dampening expression is neither an aim nor a primary ef-
fect. Thus, where "'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are com-
bined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."5
Because the governmental interest in regulating "nonspeech"
must be unconnected to expression, a reviewing court faces the
threshold question of whether particular action constitutes ex-
pressive conduct! While "[tihe First Amendment literally for-
bids the abridgement only of 'speech," the Supreme Court has
[A] good case can be made that the most vital clauses [of the United
States Constitution] may be [Airticle I, [S]ection 9's provision for habeas
corpus and the [Flirst [A]mendment clause on free speech and free press.
The first may enable one to be released from prison when wrongfully
held. The second enables one freely to speak one's mind. Grant people
guarantees such as these to live by and they may be able to move the
world.
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT CASES AND MATERIALS 20 n.41 (1991).
Justice Benjamin Cardozo remarked that the First Amendment is "the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
327 (1937). Indeed, though the Constitution "as a whole was called a charter of liber-
ty by the men who wrote and adopted it[,]" it is the First Amendment that seems to
come closest "to defining what it means to be an American today." WALTER F. BERNS,
THE FIRST AMENDmmENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at ix (1976).
4. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold's Oral Argument in New York Times, Inc. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) in MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIF-
CANT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955, at 175 (Pe-
ter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993) (alteration in the original).
5. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
6. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989). Indeed, if a law does target ex-
pression, it must survive the "most exacting scrutiny." Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
321 (1988). Such a law is justified only if the state demonstrates both a compelling
governmental interest and that the law has been narrowly drawn to achieve that
interest. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509-11 (1991); Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 231 (1987).
7. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
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"recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or
written word."8 Today, amidst debates on "political correctness,"
the battle has been joined over the interpretation of certain
expressive conduct as "nonspeech" and consequently beyond
First Amendment protection. Catharine MacKinnon, for exam-
ple, advocates defining pornographic speech as sexually abusive
conduct9 and cross-burning as "an act of terrorism,"0 thus re-
moving both from the First Amendment's ambit.
Franklyn S. Haiman," on the other hand, argues that Pro-
fessor MacKinnon's theory is mere sophistry. He rails against
the notion "that certain types of speech are really speech acts
and should therefore be treated differently from 'pure' speech,
that is subjected to the same scrutiny and possible regulation
by society as other kinds of regulable action, behavior, or con-
duct."' Haiman reasons that efforts to distinguish action from
expression are "a bit of word magic whereby the flapping of
vocal chords, the scratching of a pen, . . . or the hoisting of a
banner are transformed from symbolic to nonsymbolic behavior
by an act of definition."' He believes that a fundamental dif-
ference obtains between symbolic and nonsymbolic interactions
and that the First Amendment is always implicated in the
former and only occasionally in the latter."'4 In "Speech Acts"
and the First Amendment, Haiman explores this theme in ref-
erence to a variety of attempts from both inside and outside
8. Id. at 404. The Supreme Court has long appreciated the First Amendment's
applicability to symbolic, nonverbal expression. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-34 (1943) (recognizing that a "flag salute is a
form of utterance").
9. See CATHAmNE MACKiNNON, ONLY WORDS 45-68 (1993) (arguing that porno-
graphic speech should be treated as an act rather than expression).
10. Anthony Lewis, The First Amendment, Under Fire From the Left, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 40, 42 (quoting Catharine MacKinnon).
11. Franklyn S. Haiman is the John Evans Professor Emeritus of Communication
Studies at Northwestern University and a vice president of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union. He has written numerous articles and books on freedom of speech, includ-
ing Speech and Law in a Free Society (1981).
12. FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, "SPEECH ACTS" AND THE FRST AMENDMENT 1-2 (1993).
Haiman places the phrase "speech acts" in quotes to emphasize the concept as a
"source of more mischief than enlightenment in our discourse about freedom of
speech." Id. at xi.
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 5.
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academia to limit the extent to which conduct or action may
constitute expression.
II. EXPRESSION AND ACTION
Throughout "Speech Acts," Haiman uses the values preserved
by the First Amendment as touchstones. 5 These values in-
clude the following: the ability to participate in self-govern-
ment; 6 the idea that a free and unfettered marketplace of
ideas is the best avenue in which to search for the truth;' the
ability to express oneself;'" and, finally, "catharsis and the con-
sequent maintenance of a balance in society between stability
and change."' To this list, Haiman adds another value: the
uniquely human ability "to use, transmit, comprehend, and re-
spond to symbols" that "sets us apart from all other earthly
creatures." 0 He continues:
Although there are indications that chimpanzees, dolphins,
and whales can learn to manipulate and respond to simple
symbols and that dogs may dream, none of them have writ-
ten history books nor told stories to their offspring that
would enable those later generations to learn from the mis-
takes of their predecessors. Nor have they put paintings on
cave walls. It often has been argued that the most defining
characteristic of what it means to be human is this symbol-
15. Haiman acknowledges that Thomas Emerson initially catalogued the inventory
of First Amendment values to which we commonly refer. See THOMAS I. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966); THOMAs I. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
16. See HAIMAN, supra note 12, at 7.
17. "[Tlhere is ordinarily a better chance of approximating the truth when ideas
are challenged by competing ideas than when they are dogmatically asserted and
accepted." Id.
18. The First Amendment provides "the healthful opportunity... for individuals
to say what is on their minds and to express their creativity through literature, sci-
ence, art, music, and so on." Id. Jason Talerman has noted that "[alrtistic expression
is protected not only due to the desire for a more aesthetically pleasing landscape,
but also because it acts as a unique conduit for cultural edification." Jason Talermau,
Note, The Death of Tupac: Will Gangsta Rap Kill the First Amendment?, 14 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 117, 123 (1994) (footnote omitted).
19. HAIMAN, supra note 12, at 7. "By letting people blow off steam, a society not
only preserves its equilibrium in the short run, but is made aware of problems that
need to be addressed if that stability is to be sustained in the long run." Id.
20. Id. at 8.
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creating and symbol-transmitting capability. And if that is
what being human is mainly about, what could be more
important than a First Amendment that protects and nur-
tures it?2
1
The philosophical background thus established, Haiman turns
to the simple assertion that "words are deeds."' He suggests
that "there is time and space between speech and ac-
tion-sometimes only a moment and sometimes more, some-
times an inch and sometimes a continent-but there is always
the opportunity for the audience to think about what has been
said and decide what to do about it, and always the chance
that what has been threatened may not ensue."' Expression,
therefore, can only be assessed in context, and we should not
abide "a theorist's a priori decision to classify all threatening
utterances as speech acts that are categorically beyond the
protection of the First Amendment."' The author advocates
analyses that "take into account not only the symbolic stimulus,
but the mental response of its audience, the relationship of the
parties involved, and the context in which it occurs."'
For Haiman, symbolic expression loses First Amendment
protection when a direct relationship exists between the speech
and, say, a threat of immediate violence. He acknowledges,
however, that "there is still some time and space between the
speech and the action that follows, time and space for the audi-
ence to absorb the speaker's message and decide (though it may
be a split-second decision) what to do about it."2" Thus, the
problem with the speech act perspective is that it leaves human
beings out of the equation: "[E]xcept for the noise they make,
words [and symbols] are not like the sound of an alarm clock
21. Id. at 8-9.
22. Id. at 10 (quoting LUDWIG WrTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 46e (G.H. von
Wright ed. & Peter Winch trans., 1980)).
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id. Haiman laments the fact that the Supreme Court test articulated in Unit-
ed States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), has been misunderstood by judges and
others seeking to "apply it to instances of nonverbal, but symbolic, behavior because
certain physical by-products or components lead them to believe that more than
speech is involved." Id.
26. Id. at 23.
1994] 1351
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1347
nor are they comparable to the shaking of someone to wake
them up, where the awakening can be immediate and automat-
ic."27 The speech act perspective is especially prevalent with
regard to so-called hate speech and hate crime laws.' As the
Supreme Court has devoted some attention to these subjects, it
is helpful to discuss Haiman's arguments in light of the Cour's
decisions.
III. HATE SPEECH
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
hate speech in RA.V. v. City of St. Paul.' In the early morn-
ing hours of June 21, 1990, Robert Viktora ("R.A.V.") burned a
cross in the yard of a home belonging to an African-American
family." The City of St. Paul charged Viktora with violating
the city's hate speech ordinance. The ordinance provided that:
[wihoever places on public or private property a symbol,
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.3
Viktora challenged the ordinance on First Amendment grounds.
However, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the ordi-
nance applied only to fighting words--those displays that one
knows or should know will create anger, alarm or resentment
based on racial, ethnic, gender or religious bias." 2 Because
"fighting words" are not protected by the First Amendment,'
27. Id. at 24.
28. In 'Speech Acts," Haiman also addresses "Sexist Speech," "Information and
Communication Theft," and "Victimless Communicative Actions." See id. at 49-80.
29. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
30. See Ruth Marcus, A Family's Nightmare: Cross-Burning in St. Paul, WASH.
POST, Dec. 1, 1991, at A23.
31. ST. PAUL, MINN. LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
32. In re Welfare of R.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991), rev'd sub nor.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
33. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that
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neither was the conduct described in the St. Paul ordinance.
On appeal, a majority of the Court' held the St. Paul ordi-
nance unconstitutional because it prohibited "otherwise permit-
ted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech ad-
dressed," 5 making it akin to a forbidden content-based regula-
tion. The Court explained that fighting words may be regulated
"because of their constitutionally proscribable content,"36 and
not because they represent specifically discernable categories of
speech unrecognized by the Constitution. The unprotected fea-
tures of the fighting words are, "despite their verbal character,
essentially a 'non-speech' element of communication."7 None-
theless, the legitimate speech elements commingled with the
unprotected features of fighting words remain entitled to full
First Amendment protection.
In practice, then, a state may regulate constitutionally
proscribable speech so long as "the basis for the content dis-
crimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class
of speech ... is proscribable."' For instance, a state may con-
stitutionally proscribe obscenity involving only "the most las-
civious displays of sexual activity" because its content is wholly
obscene, but a state cannot constitutionally proscribe "only that
obscenity which includes offensive political messages" because
its content includes, in addition to obscenity, otherwise protect-
ed speech." As Justice Scalia explained, especially intolerable
modes of expression may be regulated, but expression qua ex-
pression may not.' In R.AV., the Court held that the city did
not attempt to prohibit fighting words because of the threaten-
ing "mode" through which they were expressed, but instead
sought to prohibit the expressive communication itself. Given
the Court's conclusion that hateful fighting words cannot be
proscribed, the possibility of regulating hate speech that does
"fighting words" are unprotected expression under the First Amendment).
34. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter and Thomas joined in
Justice Scalia's majority opinion. R.AV., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
35. Id. at 2542.
36. Id. at 2543.
37. Id. at 2545.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2546.
40. Id. at 2549.
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not descend to the level of fighting words would seem to be
presumptively foreclosed.
Like a majority of the Court, Haiman views hate speech laws
generally as unconstitutional because on a fundamental level
these laws impinge upon pure expression and not "speech
acts."41 "It is not the same," he writes, "to refer to people as
'niggers' or to wear white robes at a Ku Klux Klan rally as it is
to deny African-Americans equality of opportunity for jobs,
education, or housing."' According to the author, the former is
expressive conduct, while the latter is simply action. The harms
that flow from speech must be distinguished from harms suf-
fered as the result of actions. Actions have definite and inevita-
ble effects; the consequences of expression, on the other hand,
are probabilities that may occur: "[nione of them are [sic] au-
tomatic or inevitable. Like the responses to all pure speech,
these consequences are mediated by what goes on in the
victim's mind; and that will vary according to the past experi-
ences, psychological and physical strength, status, needs, and
goals of each particular target."' While Haiman is not insen-
sitive to the emotional harms of hate speech,' he does not be-
lieve such harms justify prohibition in most cases:
Even if one were to concede . . . that the emotional distress
some victims of hate speech experience is sufficiently seri-
ous, predictable, and verifiable to make legal remedies a
feasible and justified response, questions remain whether
41. See HAIMAN, supra note 12, at 26-27.
42. Id. at 2,7.
43. Id. at 28. "Any time the mind processes a communication, it is acting as an
intermediary between stimulus and response, and that means reflection is taking
place, even if only for a split second and is almost automatic." Id. at 29.
44. See id. at 29-30. Hate speech, symbolic and otherwise, tends to subordinate
and victimize individuals and groups. As Susan Gellman has observed, '[psychological
responses [to hate speech] include humiliation, isolation and self-hatred. These re-
sponses may affect intergroup relations and even relationships within the group." Su-
san Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your
Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 333, 340-41 (1991). See also Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2320, 2336 (1989)
(discussing the physical and psychological effects of hate speech).
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such remedies are counterproductive and whether they are
the most effective way of dealing with the problem.45
Haiman suggests that prohibition does not dissipate hateful
expression; rather, it tends to force such attitudes under-
ground,' and experience dictates that once underground, sup-
pressed views may flourish.47 Moreover, hatred may then be
expressed "in more indirect and sophisticated ways"' as the
suppressed ideas become a "forbidden fruit," turning "advocates
of racism into martyrs."49
Let us return for a moment to the situation the Supreme
Court faced in RA.V. As Haiman insists, an instant of human
thought and reflection often lies between pure speech and pure
action. In finding that Robert Viktora's act in R.A.V. conveyed a
"distinctive idea," the Court inferred the existence of such a mo-
ment.0 But the Court's rigid formalism failed to take account
of the actual context in which the act occurred. This is unfortu-
nate because humans do not interact in a vacuum, and con-
text-the circumstances, or setting, in which action oc-
curs-offers a key to determining whether a moment of thought
and reflection is truly possible.
Whether communication is protected speech or a nonspeech
act depends upon the kind of conduct "combined with the fac-
tual context and environment in which it was undertaken."'
With this standard in mind, we can endeavor to separate cer-
tain pure action from pure speech without resorting to labeling
conduct a "speech act." The actual context of R.AV. illustrates
the distinction: it seems extremely doubtful that a family wak-
ing in the middle of the night to a burning cross on their front
45. HAIMAN, supra note 12, at 32.
46. See id.
47. In the People's Republic of China, for instance, government-sponsored suppres-
sion of "dangerous" religious beliefs has resulted in the latent popularity of those
same beliefs. See THOIiAS HEBERER, CHINA AND ITS NATIONAL MINORITIES: AUTONOmiY
OR ASSIMILATION? 113 (1989).
48. HAIMAN, supra note 12, at 33.
49. Id.
50. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
51. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974). See also Towne v. Eisner,
245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (noting that speech "may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used").
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lawn could objectively respond--even for an instant-in any
way approximating reasoned reflection.52 Viewed in this light,
Viktora's conduct looks more like MacKinnon's "act of terror-
ism" and less like an act of expression, and St. Paul's ordi-
nance, at least so far as it concerned such acts, edges toward
constitutionality."
Still, the Supreme Court has spoken, and subsequent judicial
decisions reflect R.A.V.'s reasoning. Consider State v.
Sheldon,' a post-RAV. Maryland case concerning Brandon
Forrest Sheldon who ignited a cross on the property of a black
family and Thomas Eugene Cole who burned a cross on state-
owned property. Neither Sheldon nor Cole had notified the
respective property owners of his intentions. Their actions vio-
lated a statute that made cross-burning on public or private
property owned by another unlawful.' These defendants com-
mitted identical acts in different contexts, but given the con-
straints imposed by the statutory language, the Maryland Su-
preme Court had little choice but to conclude that both acts
were "'speech' in contemplation of the First Amendment."'
Even if the statute had applied only to private property, the
constraints imposed by R.A.V. would appear to have precluded
meaningful examination of contextual considerations. Absent
such examination, a question remains whether Sheldon's burn-
ing a cross on the property of a black family was expression or
a simple act of violence deserving "no sanctuary in the First
Amendment."57
52. "lit is reasonable to distinguish between contexts in which talk leaves room
for reply and those in which talk triggers action or causes harm without the time or
opportunity for response." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 837
(2d ed. 1988).
53. See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 115 (1993) (referring
to the "rather concrete terrorist act of cross-burning on the lawn of a black family").
54. 629 A.2d 753 (Md. 1993).
55. Id. at 755-56.
56. Id. at 755.
57. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 75 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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IV. HATE CRIMES
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell," a decision delivered after the
publication of Haiman's book, the Supreme Court turned its
attention to hate crime statutes. On October 7, 1989, a group of
young black men and boys, including Todd Mitchell, approached
a white boy on the street in Kenosha, Wisconsin:
As the boy walked by, Mitchell said: "You all want to fuck
somebody up? There goes a white boy; go get him." Mitchell
counted to three and pointed in the boy's direction. The
group ran towards the boy, beat him severely, and stole his
tennis shoes. The boy was rendered unconscious and re-
mained in a coma for four days.59
A jury convicted Mitchell of aggravated battery. Because the
jury found that he had intentionally selected his victim based
on the boy's race, Mitchell's sentence was increased from two to
seven years of imprisonment under the hate crime statute."o
The statute provided, in pertinent part, that if a person com-
mits a crime such as battery and intentionally "selects the
person against whom the crime... is committed... because
of the actor's belief or perception regarding the race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry
of that person," the maximum punishment may be increased.6'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the statute violated
the First Amendment.'
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court began
by noting that "a physical assault is not by any stretch of the
imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amend-
ment."' The Court concluded that enhancing punishment be-
58. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
59. Id. at 2196-97 (citations omitted).
60. See id.
61. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.645(1)(b) (West Supp. 1994).
62. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811-12, 816-17 (Wis. 1992).
63. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199 (1993) (citing Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)) ("[Violence or other types of potentially ex-
pressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative im-
pact . .. are entitled to no constitutional protection."); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
1994] 1357
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cause of the defendant's discriminatory motive in selecting a
victim does not offend. the First Amendment. While "a
defendant's abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people,
may not be taken into consideration by a sentencing judge,"'
the judge may consider the defendant's motive when making
sentencing decisions. In this respect, the Court likened the
Wisconsin hate crime statute to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which "makes it unlawful for an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee 'because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'
The Court also distinguished the statute at hand from the
ordinance struck down in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul," conclud-
ing that the latter "was explicitly directed at expression (i.e.,
'speech' or 'messages')" while this statute was "aimed at conduct
unprotected by the First Amendment." 7 The Court viewed the
hate crime statute as a reflection of the state's desire to redress
the particular individual and societal harms created by hate
crimes. As such, the statute was not overbroad and did not
"chill" speech; the Court thought it "too speculative a hypothe-
sis" that a citizen might suppress his or her bigoted beliefs
because they might someday be introduced at trial should he or
she commit an offense under the statute."
In broadly asserting that Wisconsin's statute targets conduct
and not speech, the Court declined to recognize the expressive
elements of Mitchell's actions.69 As Haiman explains, hate
crimes do possess expressive elements; they are not "speech
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) ("The First Amendment does not protect violence.").
64. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
65. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988)).
66. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
67. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201 (citation omitted).
68. See id.
69. The speech-conduct debate has long raged, and the distinction between the
two is not so simple as the Court would have us believe: "[In the real world, com-
municative and non-communicative aspects of conduct are constantly intertwined. Any
worthwhile system of free expression must be sufficiently sophisticated to deal with
the reality that communication is almost always an admixture of 'speech' and "con-
duct. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCmTY 26 (1992). Mitchell and
R.AV. ably demonstrate the blurred line between speech and conduct. See Horwitz,
supra note 53, at 115-16 (discussing the Mitchell opinion's "exceedingly fine distinc-
tion from RAY.V.").
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acts," but "physical behaviors with speech ingredients, just the
converse of an oration, which is speech behavior with the physi-
cal ingredients of noise."70 He makes it clear that because hate
crime statutes like Wisconsin's enhance sentences when the
underlying crime is bias-related, these statutes do acknowledge
the expression of beliefs and attitudes. On balance, though,
Haiman agrees that hate crime statutes are constitutional. 1
To ensure that punishment would be enhanced only when such
conduct rises to the level of commission of a crime, he urges
that these laws must "specify that the only offenses to be pun-
ished are those acts that would normally qualify as criminal
behavior-assault and battery, arson, murder, and so on-and
that enhanced penalties would be triggered only when those
acts have been demonstrably motivated by group hatred."72
Applying Haiman's standard requires a court to determine
when an utterance is sufficient to evidence group hatred. In
State v. Stalder,73 the Florida Supreme Court, construing that
state's hate crime statute, recognized that the commission of
the crime must adduce the group hatred; "the fact that racial
prejudice may be exhibited during the commission of the crime
is itself insufficient."74 Thus, where A beats B because B is a
member of a particular racial group, "the selection of a vic-
tim... is an integral part of the underlying crime."'m Such an
instance may be distinguished from "offenses committed for
some reason other than prejudice but that nevertheless show
bias in their commission."76 Where A beats B because of
jealousy, but during the beating calls B a racial epithet, the
expression and the action share only the same temporal frame-
work. Without more than temporal and spatial proximity, A
should not be subject to enhanced penalties, for such evidence
70. Haiman, supra note 12, at 35.
71. See id. at 48.
72. Id. at 45.
73. 630 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994).
74. Id. at 1076-77 (quoting Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992)) (emphasis omitted). Stalder concerned the constitutionality of the Florida
hate crimes statute requiring penalty enhancement as applied to the defendant, who
assaulted the complainant and maligned his ethnicity. See id. at 1073.
75. Id. at 1076.
76. Id.
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does not adequately demonstrate that A selected B as a victim
based upon B's race.77
For some, even this analysis may not go far enough in expli-
cating the First Amendment considerations inherent in penalty
enhancement statutes. Robert S. Peck has taken both Haiman
and the United States Supreme Court to task for insufficiently
addressing his core concern, namely that "[tihe First
Amendment's protection of ideas, speech, and associa-
tions-including those that society deems morally contempt-
ible-should not be limited to preventing these thoughts and
utterances from being the basis of a crime; it should also pre-
vent them from being the basis of additional punishment."78 In
Peck's view, "[the state simply cannot, consistent with the fed-
eral Constitution, exact a price from individuals for holding
beliefs that are at odds with those of larger society."79
It is true that if A beats B silently, A can be punished only
for battery, even if A harbored bigoted thoughts toward B. But
where A openly selects B for a beating based upon the latter's
race, A's sentence is greater not because of A's beliefs, but be-
cause A committed a criminal act in furtherance of those be-
liefs.8" The possibility of greater punishment does not force A
to abandon prejudicial beliefs; it only deters A from expressing
those beliefs through criminal action. Absent that criminal
action, A would suffer no punishment whatsoever. Indeed, rath-
77. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 818 (Wis. 1992) (Abrahamson, J., dis-
senting) (reasoning that the state "must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that
the defendant committed the underlying crime and that the defendant intentionally
selected the victim because of characteristics protected under the statute").
78. Robert S. Peck, Deciding When Speech Isn't Speech, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 667, 673 (1993-94) (reviewing FRANKLYN S. HAimAN, "SPEECH ACTS" AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1993)). Peck believes Haiman "gives in to the understandable
temptation to label some forms of expression simply unworthy of protection given the
countervailing social interests. For a free speech advocate, however, such lapses serve
to weaken the First Amendment, at which a multitude of forces continue to chip
away." Id. at 678.
79. Id. at 673.
80. See HAIMAN, supra note 12, at 45 (noting that penalties would be "bumped
up" only where thought has led to criminal action). In effect, well-drafted hate crime
laws would function like antidiscrimination laws which preclude the practice of dis-
crimination, not the First Amendment right to hold discriminatory beliefs. See Hishon
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (concluding that freedom of expression
and association do not prevent the application of Title V11 to employment decisions).
1360
"SPEECH ACTS" AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
er than curtailing expression, on an instrumental level, a penal-
ty enhancement framework may actually function to enlarge the
marketplace of ideas. The threat of enhanced punishment could
compel A to consider expressing hatred of B in any number of
ways, from placards to newspaper advertisements to bumper
stickers. Thus, penalty enhancement statutes based upon
Haiman's model may yet allow the state to play a role in chan-
neling bias-motivated conduct away from threats and violence
into more productive expressive avenues.8'
V. CONCLUSION
By reminding us that calling expressive conduct a "speech
act" does not eliminate First Amendment concerns, Franklyn S.
Haiman has made a thoughtful contribution to debates over
political correctness and hateful expression. Moreover, "Speech
Acts" and the First Amendment offers some indication of the
direction in which these debates must eventually turn. "If there
is any hope of changing the attitudes of the haters," it will
come not through speech regulations, but through exposing hat-
ers "to more enlightened ways of thinking and, in the long run,
through alleviating the causes of their insecurity."82 It would
be disingenuous to believe that the enactment of hate speech
laws or penalty enhancement statutes would result in an end to
intolerance. To confront hateful expression we must, as Patricia
Williams advises, set aside talk of freedom of speech for a few
minutes and do some hard thinking about our great investment
"in the fashionability of hate."' Only after we address its true
causes will we be able to reckon with the manifestations of
hate which currently pervade our lives and preoccupy our free
speech discourse.
81. Owen Fiss has more thoroughly explored the notion of an activist role for the
state in the marketplace of ideas. See Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV.
781 (1987).
82. HAIATAN, supra note 12, at 34.
83. Patricia J. Williams, Hate Radio: Why we need to tune in to Limbaugh and
Stern, MS., MarJApr. 1994, at 25, 29.
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